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# KENNEDY SHAPES PENTAGON TIES

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Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, July 1—The appointment this week of General Maxwell D. Taylor as military representative of the President caused mixed emotions in Washington, particularly in the Pentagon.

Officially the capabilities and experience of General Taylor were emphasized, and the advantages of a high-ranking military liaison officer were stressed. But unofficially there were many misgivings.

The appointment immediately focused attention upon the existing relationships between the President and his White House aides and the Pentagon, including the services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

These relationships, outwardly amicable, have nevertheless been roiled beneath the surface.

## Army Disappointed

All available evidence would seem to suggest that the President understands the high importance of military power and respects the military services. His initial amendments to the Eisenhower defense budget have pleased the services though the Army's great expectations prior to last Jan. 20 have been, so far, badly disappointed. If there is a gap between White House and the armed forces, per se, it is the traditional one between political and military thinking.

Between President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert J. McNamara, there appears to be a close relationship, even though Mr. McNamara could not be called an "intimate." Mr. McNamara was unknown to the President until shortly before his appointment as Secretary of Defense. Prior to his appointment he was advised that his usefulness would depend to a high degree upon a close mutual confidence and understanding between him and the President.

The developing relationship between the President and the Secretary of Defense appears to be good, and many of the President's advisers have expressed high admiration for the incisive qualities of the Secretary's mind.

## Debate Over Taylor's Role Points Up Problems With Military



Yardley in The Baltimore Sun

"Some say that the pen is mightier than the sword."

## The Joint Chiefs

The relationships between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are more complex. Under present law the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body are the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President. But practically the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, often represent the rest of the Joint Chiefs at White House meetings. The other chiefs have had access to the President, though less regularly. This is particularly true of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the retiring Chief of Naval Operations, who will leave office in August after six years of service, longer than any other "CNO." In fact, tentative feelers suggesting that Admiral Burke might assume the office now tendered to General Taylor were reported reliably some weeks ago, and the President and those around him are known to respect Admiral Burke's strength of character.

Nevertheless there have been persistent, though muted criticisms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which became particularly emphatic (especially of General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke) after the Cuban fiasco. Some of the President's assistants openly "passed the buck" to the Joint Chiefs, and the President himself told one caller he had lost confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Senator Albert Gore echoed this publicly Secretary McNamara allowed many days to elapse before he defended his military subordinates—and then only in answer to a press conference question. The President, who was subsequently photographed with them, was even slower in his reactions.

## Dissatisfaction Indicated

General Taylor's appointment inevitably indicates the President's dissatisfaction with his past relationships with the Pentagon and with the Central Intelligence Agency; he hopes to improve them.

But the problems created by the appointment are major and whether it will help or hinder will depend upon numerous factors—some intangible.

One of the most important of these is the President's own personality and methodology; Taylor's role, power and influence will depend, like those of other advisers to the President, upon the confidence the President shows toward Taylor and the general's closeness to him. Each President differs in his approach to the supreme job of government; no legislation can provide for these differences. Mr. Kennedy appears to have a dislike for the ordered mechanics that President Eisenhower loved, and the Taylor appointment is another indication of the growing importance in this administration of a new kind of Kennedy "Kitchen Cabinet."

But the man who sits by the throne willy-nilly reflects the power of the throne. General Taylor's exclusion from command and operational functions

means little; none of the Joint Chiefs now have such powers; his position—as military representative of the President and adviser—plus his four-star rank and seniority, are bound to give him great powers.

General Taylor's own attributes are likely to add to these powers. He has a facile, brilliant mind; he is used to the exercise of authority and responsibility; he will be no mere transmission belt for the passage of ideas and data from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House. He will not hesitate to advise and to sell his ideas; in fact he is already doing so. It seems clear that another echelon has been interposed between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency and the President; whether this will facilitate or hamper the decision-making process—and the formulation of sound decisions—will depend upon the development of a multi-lateral relationship between the President, General Taylor, Mr. McNamara and Mr. Dulles or his successor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### Possible Meaning

Another problem in the appointment is the belief by many in and out of the Pentagon that it represents a step toward the down-grading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, and the possible ultimate emergence of a single powerful chief of staff. General Taylor has publicly stated in the past his support for the elimination of the Joint Chiefs as now constituted and the substitution of a single chief of staff. His own beliefs on this subject; the blow in White House esteem that the Joint Chiefs have suffered—quite possibly through no fault of their own—since the Cuban fiasco; and the inherent power in General Taylor's position worry those who fear that the appointment is a transitional one to a more sweeping reorganization. They point out in any case that whether or not the Kennedy Administration chooses to ask for a re-

vision of the National Security Act, which makes the Joint Chiefs by law collectively the principal military advisers to the President, General Taylor will be, actually, in position to have the last word.

Some military men, however, see in the Taylor appointment a long-needed balancing of civilian with military advice. The swollen upper echelons of the Pentagon bulge with civilian secretaries, assistants and deputies, and—particularly since Mr. McNamara's administration—there has been a tendency to blur over, or de-emphasize purely military advice, or at least to substitute civilian analysis for it. A military man at the right hand of the President might tend to some extent to balance this.

### Taylor's Views

A final factor concerns General Taylor's ideas about military policy and organization. Some of these have ardent backing in and out of the Pentagon, particularly among persons who might be called the military intellectuals, but others of his ideas are decidedly controversial and have aroused considerable opposition. The General, in his book, "The Uncertain Trumpet," favors a reallocation of service roles and missions which are now sanctified by custom, tradition and inferentially by law. He advocates what would seem to amount to functional forces (strategic forces; limited war forces, etc.) and supports establishment of a limited war headquarters for planning limited war. These and other "reforms" would seem to promise controversy if he should push them in his new job.

In fact, controversy over the Taylor appointment already echoed in Washington this week—on the floor of Congress, and in the Pentagon from the Office of Secretary McNamara down to the "B" and "C" ring offices of the "indians"—the colonels and captains; lieutenant-colonel and commanders—who keep the Pentagon running.

### Matter of Utilization

In the last analysis the Taylor appointment will produce good or evil depending largely upon how the President utilizes his newest adviser. The powers and responsibilities of the President, particularly in his role as Commander-in-Chief are immense. But he cannot insulate himself from the necessity of choice.

Ernest May, in his book, "The Ultimate Decision—The President As Commander-in-Chief," stresses the importance of disputes.

"The President will be Commander-in-Chief in name only," Mr. May writes, "unless he continues to have at least two competing commanders underneath him bringing their disputes to him for adjudication. That is what an issue is—and without issues, there are no decisions. The burden of the Commander-in-Chief cannot be shared. The question is whether it has become so great that the power must be transferred.

"History cannot answer this \* \* \*. However, it suggests caution. The character of the man who is President and Commander-in-Chief is probably more important than the organization of the office \* \* \*."